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Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spotty” Regulation: Why
the Federal Government Should Let States Control
Unconventional Onshore Drilling
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a shift of focus in the oil and gas
industry. Conventional sources of energy are drying up.1 Global
demand is on the rise.2 And offshore drilling, though potentially
extremely lucrative, has proven to be a risky endeavor.3 As many
experts see it, solutions for developers must now come in the form of
unconventional onshore extraction techniques, which allow
operators to tap reserves previously thought uneconomical or even
impossible to produce.4 While developers have traditionally focused
on cheap, vertical wells and shallow pools of oil and gas, future
economic success will likely require expensive directional drilling and
unconventional sources of energy.5
1. See, e.g., ENERGY PORTFOLIOS 81 (U. Aswathanarayana & Rao S. Divi eds., 2009)
(“The world’s production of conventional hydrocarbons will soon decline.”).
2. See, e.g., id. at 82 (“[W]orld energy consumption is projected . . . to expand by 50
percent from 2005 to 2030.”).
3. The 2010 catastrophe involving BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig is, of course, the classic
example. As stated by a national commission formed in response to the incident:
The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster undermined public faith in the oil and gas
industry, in government regulators, and even in America’s ability to respond to
crises. . . . The development of offshore energy resources contributes substantially to
local economies, supporting business small and large and employing tens of
thousands of workers. But any sensible energy policy must recognize the substantial
risks that accompany these real benefits . . . .
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING 293–95 (2011) [hereinafter BP COMM’N].
4. See, e.g., ROBERT L. EVANS, FUELING OUR FUTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 65 (2007) (“There is a need . . . to develop new or ‘non-conventional’
sources of fossil fuels to supplement the traditional crude oil supplies. . . . In the near-term
these ‘new’ sources . . . include the unlocking of ‘synthetic oil’ from the extensive oil sands and
oil shale deposits found in many parts of the world, and the extraction of natural gas from
unused coal seams, known as ‘coal-bed methane.’”).
5. See, e.g., AARON M. AZELTON & ANDREW S. TEUFEL, FISHER INVESTMENTS ON
ENERGY 7–8 (2009) (“[M]any believe the largest, most easily accessible conventional oil and
gas deposits in the world are already tapped. As a result, companies must search for oil and gas
in increasingly harsh environments like deep offshore or rugged, remote terrains. The
advancement of technology has enabled firms to tap into increasingly remote areas and at
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The Barnett Shale play in Texas offers an illustrative example.
One of the largest natural gas discoveries in the world, the field sits
directly below the city of Fort Worth, Texas, where gas extraction is
only possible at a price of $2–3 million per well.6 Even then, drilling
would not be economical without the use of hydraulic fracturing7
(often referred to as “fracking” or “hydrofracking”), a technique
used to break up source rock by injecting large amounts of water and
other substances into a well at such high pressures that the rock
cracks, or fractures.8 The injected fluid usually contains a propping
agent (normally sand or artificial ceramic beads), which “props
open” the fracture and allows oil and gas to flow to the wellhead.9
Hydrofracking in the Barnett Shale is often combined with
horizontal drilling, a technique that extends a well’s reach and allows
operators to produce gas in urban areas where population concerns
10
complicate the drilling process. These methods are also employed
in rural regions. In the Williston Basin of western North Dakota and
eastern Montana, for example, fracking and horizontal drilling
enable developers to target tight shale plays where oil could not be
efficiently produced only a decade or two ago.11 In fact, such wellstimulation techniques have become so efficient and so lucrative for
greater depths. Moreover, technology and high oil and gas prices may also make it
economically viable to tap unconventional hydrocarbons, which were previously too expensive
to recover profitably.”).
6. Billie Ann Maxwell, Note, Texas Tug of War: A Survey of Urban Drilling and the
Issues an Operator Will Face, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 337, 338, 341 (2009).
7. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2008)
(“[T]he Barnett Shale in north Texas . . . is entirely dependent on hydraulic fracturing.”).
8. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FACTURING OF COALBED METHANE
RESERVOIRS STUDY app. A-1 (U.S. Dep’t of Energy: Hydraulic Fracturing White Paper)
(2004),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudy_attach_uic_append_a_doe_whitepaper.pdf.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Lisa Vaughn, New Facets of Old Alternatives for Unleased Mineral Interests,
16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 113, 114 (2009) (“[A] horizontal well’s bore site [can] be placed
far from where the reservoir will actually be tapped, thus allowing operators to comply with
municipal regulations and public policy issues by placing drilling activities further from
homes.”).
11. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Drilling Boom Revives Hopes for Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/
business/25gas.htm (explaining that much of the shale in the U.S. “has been known for more
than a century to contain gas, but it was considered virtually worthless until a decade ago”
because companies lacked the technologies, like fracking, needed to extract the gas
economically).
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oil producers in the U.S. that most of the country’s oil and gas
billionaires have made their fortunes investing in onshore, not
offshore, drilling.12
At the same time, few onshore operations pose more concerns
than hydraulic fracturing. The debate regarding its potential negative
environmental effects has morphed into an outright firestorm in
recent years, with drilling advocates staunchly defending the
practice13 but facing fierce opposition from environmental groups
and even politicians.14 New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman, for example, has promised to sue to keep
hydrofracking out of his state until more information is available
regarding its environmental effects.15
12. Christopher Helman, America’s Richest Oilmen, FORBES.COM (June 17, 2010, 1:00
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/17/koch-hamm-bass-kaiser-business-energy-oilbillionaires.html.
13. See, e.g., INDEP. PETROL. ASS’N OF AM., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: EFFECTS ON
ENERGY SUPPLY, THE ECONOMY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (2008), available at
http://www.energyindepth.org/PDF/Hydraulic-Fracturing-3-E%27s.pdf
(“[H]ydraulic
fracturing has never presented an environmental risk.”).
14. See, e.g., Jennifer Goldman, Hydraulic Fracturing Myths and Facts, OIL & GAS
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT/EARTHWORKS 1 (April 23, 2009), available at
http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/FS_hydraulic-fracturing_myths-factsFINAL.pdf
(“Hydraulic fracturing fluids contain toxic chemicals and are being injected into and near
drinking water supplies.”).
15. Jon Campbell, Attorney General-Elect Schneiderman Staunchly Opposes Hydraulic
Fracturing, STARGAZETTE.COM (Nov. 7, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://www.stargazette.com/
article/20101107/NEWS01/11070359/1113/Attorney-General-elect-Schneidermanstaunchly-opposes-hydraulic-fracturing. The fracking controversy inspired David Pursell, a
research analyst at an energy investment bank, to pen the following lines, borrowing from a
famous scene in A Few Good Men:
You want the truth? You can’t handle the truth! We live in a world that needs clean
natural gas, and gas wells have to be frac’d by men with rigs and pumps. Who’s
gonna do it? Microsoft? Apple? The energy industry has greater responsibility than
you could possibly fathom. You weep for your i-phone app, and you curse the frac
crews. You have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what we know.
That fossil energy fuels economic growth. And the existence of frac’ing, while
grotesque and incomprehensible to you, powers our economy. You don’t want the
truth because deep down in places you don’t talk about on Facebook, you want
them on that frac, you need them on that frac. We use words like pressure,
proppant, conductivity. We use these words as the backbone of a life spent
producing gas. You use them as a punchline. We have neither the time nor the
inclination to explain ourselves to someone who takes a hot shower every morning
using the natural gas that we provide, and then questions the manner in which we
provide it. We would rather you just said thank you, and went on your way.
Otherwise, we suggest you pick up a pipe wrench, and meet us on location. We have
wells to frac!
John McFarland, More on the Frac’ing Controversy, OIL AND GAS LAWYER BLOG (Oct. 1,
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Although hydraulic fracturing has been widely employed by the
energy industry for more than sixty years, the last decade has
witnessed an intense push for more government regulation,
especially from the federal level.16 This Comment will discuss the
various legal issues implicated by this enormously lucrative practice,
as well as evaluate the desirability of additional federal controls.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that regulatory decisions in this
realm are best left to the states. While environmental concerns over
hydrofracking should not be ignored, in many cases they have been
overstated. More importantly, the characteristics of reserves (and
therefore specific hydraulic fracturing techniques) vary from state to
state, making the success of any regulatory system highly dependent
on regulators’ knowledge of local and regional industry realities.
Each of the nation’s major oil- and gas-producing states have
effectively grappled with both the environmental and legal challenges
posed by the practice since its inception more than half a century
ago, and they have done so in a way that has not only generally
protected public health but also encouraged economic growth and
preserved state common law theories regarding oil and gas
development and tort liability. At this late stage, adding an extra
layer of federal control will not only fail to diminish fracking’s
environmental effects but will also create unnecessary inefficiencies
that could cripple operators’ ability to meet domestic energy
demand.
This Comment begins, in Part II, with a background section
discussing the history and regulation of hydraulic fracturing and
highlighting the predominantly positive effects the practice has had
on the economics of the oil and gas industry. Part III then analyzes
both the legal problems and the environmental concerns created by
fracking, outlining how various states have addressed them and

2010, 3:50 PM), http://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/2010/10/more-on-the-fracingcontrovers.html.
16. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and
Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 182–
87 (2009) (arguing that the federal government should complete a comprehensive study of
fracking’s effects and consider regulating it under the Safe Drinking Water Act); Angela C.
Cupas, Note, The Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why We Must Regulate Hydraulic
Fracturing at the Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605 (2009).
Professor Wiseman’s article is by far the most comprehensive review of hydraulic fracturing
published by a legal scholar in recent years. This Comment is intended, at least in part, to offer
counterarguments to several of her main points.
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discussing the recent push for additional federal controls. Part IV
argues that hydrofracking solutions should be enacted at the state
and local levels, avoiding the costs and conflicts created by federal
regulation of issues traditionally left to the domain of state and local
governments. Finally, Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Economic Effects
The first hydraulic fracturing job was completed in 1947 on the
Klepper No. 1 well in western Kansas.17 At the time, fracking fluid
consisted of “a gasoline-based napalm gel,”18 which obviously made
the fracturing process hazardous for rig workers.19 The Klepper
operators’ goal was to compare fracking with acidizing,20 a technique
that involves injecting either hydrofluoric or hydrochloric acid
(depending on the type of source rock) into the well to eat away
production-impeding material.21 As it turned out, acidizing was
more effective on the Klepper,22 but fracking eventually developed
into “a standard treatment” for well stimulation in the U.S.23 Since
the Klepper No. 1 was drilled, U.S. developers have completed
almost a million frack jobs.24
Today, fracking companies work in every major oil- and gasproducing state, often stimulating wells near metropolitan areas and
in densely-populated states where oil and gas extraction has a more
limited history.25 And just as drilling challenges vary by location, so
17. CARBONATE RESERVOIR CHARACTERIZATION: A GEOLOGIC – ENGINEERING
ANALYSIS, PART II 296–97 (George V. Chilingarian et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS].
18. Id. at 296.
19. EVAN K. NYER ET AL., IN SITU TREATMENT TECHNOLOGY 444 (2d ed. 2001).
20. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, supra note 17, at 297.
21. Oil Well Stimulation, OILPRIMER.COM (2008), http://www.oilprimer.com/oilwell-stimulation.html (last visited February 21, 2011).
22. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, supra note 17, at 297.
23. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8, at A-1.
24. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34201, SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
(SDWA): SELECTED REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 22 (2010).
25. Id. Gas discoveries in formations like the Marcellus Shale (located in parts of New
York, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania), for example, have spurred increased hydraulic
fracturing in eastern states. As Tiemann explains, with the increase in drilling come “new
concerns about possible gas development threats to underground sources of drinking water.”
Id.
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too do fracking methods. In many places, companies routinely
perform multistage fracks along horizontal26 wellbores.27 This
technique has been especially popular in Texas’s prolific Barnett
Shale,28 as well as in the Bakken Shale of North Dakota and
Montana, where experts estimate nearly four billion barrels of oil
could still be recovered.29
As fracking technologies have improved, fracking’s popularity—
and its importance to the energy industry—has seen extraordinary
growth. As Professor Wiseman describes:
In 2000, the Railroad Commission of Texas issued 273 permits for
drilling in the Barnett Shale. In 2004 it issued 1,112 permits, and
by 2007 the number . . . had skyrocketed to 3,653. In Montana,
every oil well in the Bakken Shale formation is frac[k]ed, with more
than 600 wells drilled to-date, while local newspapers report that
operators in New York’s Marcellus Shale may drill and frac[k] more
than 1,500 wells annually.30

Of course, the growth in drilling has turned hydraulic fracturing
into big business. The Independent Petroleum Association of
America estimates that 90% of all U.S. wells undergo some form of
fracturing, which accounts for 30% of the country’s recoverable

26. Horizontal drilling is the process of drilling vertically to a target formation and then
turning the wellbore horizontally along the formation to complete the well. This is essentially
the definition adopted by the Department of Energy:
Horizontal drilling is the process of drilling and completing, for production, a well
that begins as a vertical or inclined linear bore which extends from the surface to a
subsurface location just above the target oil or gas reservoir called the “kickoff
point,” then bears off on an arc to intersect the reservoir at the “entry point,” and,
thereafter, continues at a near-horizontal attitude tangent to the arc, to substantially
or entirely remain within the reservoir until the desired bottom hole location is
reached.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DRILLING SIDEWAYS – A REVIEW OF
HORIZONTAL WELL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATION 1 (1993), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/drilling_sideways_w
ell_technology/pdf/tr0565.pdf.
27. See Rocky Seale, Open-Hole Completion System Enables Multi-Stage Fracturing and
Stimulation Along Horizontal Wellbores, DRILLING CONTRACTOR, July/Aug. 2007, at 112.
28. See Maxwell, supra note 6, at 340 (“Development of natural gas in the Barnett Shale
requires horizontal drilling and a technique called hydraulic fracturing.”).
29. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL RESOURCES IN
THE DEVONIAN-MISSISSIPPIAN BAKKEN FORMATION, WILLISTON BASIN PROVINCE,
MONTANA AND NORTH DAKOTA 1 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/
3021/pdf/FS08-3021_508.pdf.
30. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 123–24 (citations omitted).
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reserves.31 Experts say that, from shales alone, developers could
produce nearly 850 trillion cubic feet of gas, “enough to supply
about forty years’ worth of natural gas, at today’s consumption
rate.”32 In order to extract it, thousands of wells will have to be
drilled33—and, of course, fracked.
Developers’ ability to produce oil and gas from previously
ignored formations has resulted in huge economic rewards, not only
for well owners and operators, but also for rig workers, local
governments, and community members. Lease bonuses from Barnett
Shale producers, for example, have already generated over $100
million for the city of Fort Worth, which “expects to receive more
than $1 billion in natural gas revenues over the next 20 years.”34 A
2009 study predicts that operations in the area will create 70,000
jobs and add $6.5 billion annually to the Texas economy.35 School
districts with mineral interests in the area have even begun using well
revenues to create scholarship programs.36
Production from other shale formations has led to similar
economic rewards. As a 2008 New York Times article described:
In the United States, real estate speculators are becoming overnight
millionaires in Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Texas by buying up
parcels of land and flipping them to companies that drill for natural
gas. Wildcatters are ordering every rig they can get their hands on,
and paying signing bonuses of $25,000 an acre to drill below
houses, schools and churches. Pipeline companies are building as
fast as they can to get the new gas to market.37

Production from the Bakken has added so many jobs to North
Dakota’s economy that the state now has by far the country’s lowest
unemployment rate at 3.3 percent.38 In some cities, like Williston,
31. INDEP. PETROL. ASS’N OF AM., supra note 13.
32. Krauss, supra note 11.
33. Id.
34. Barnett Shale Energy Educ. Council, Facts About Barnett Shale, BSEEC.ORG
http://www.bseec.org/stories/BarnettShale (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Krauss, supra note 11.
38. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics: Unemployment Rates
for States, BLS.GOV, http://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm (last modified Sept. 16,
2011). See also Monica Davey, A State with Plenty of Jobs but Few Places to Live, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/us/
21ndakota.html (“While the rest of the country was sinking into recession, North Dakota
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the growth happened so quickly that workers could not find
housing—even in motels and mobile home parks.39
All this prosperity is the result of a major change in the oil and
gas industry. With easily accessible formations beginning to water
out, developers are concentrating on far deeper, tighter plays where
source rock is less permeable. This change, a necessary one if the
United States wishes to avoid significant decreases in domestic
production, is only possible because of hydraulic fracturing.40
B. Minimal Federal Regulation
Regulation of hydraulic fracturing has traditionally been left to
states and local governments, and, until recently, federal agencies
have shied away from including it within the scope of their control.41
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion in a suit brought
by the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF), which
argued that fracking should be regulated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Safe Drinking Water Act.42 The
Act requires states wishing to retain control of their underground
injection control (UIC) programs to regulate any “underground
injection” of fluid not allowed by permit or rule.43 LEAF petitioned
the EPA to withdraw its approval of an Alabama UIC program that
did not regulate the injection of fracking fluids, but the EPA refused,
determining that the definition of “underground injection”
encompassed “only those wells whose ‘principal function’ is the
underground placement of fluids.”44 Since the principal function of
fracked wells is gas production, the EPA decided that regulation was
never did. . . . A rise in oil production here, especially, served as an antidote to any whiff of
what the rest of the nation was witnessing.”).
39. Davey, supra note 38.
40. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 29 (Tex. 2008)
(Willett, J., concurring) (“We are more and more over a barrel as ‘our reserves of fossil fuels
are becoming harder and more expensive to find.’ Given this supply-side slide, maximizing
recovery via frac[k]ing is essential.” (quoting Bruce Write, The Texas Portfolio, FISCAL NOTES:
SPECIAL ENERGY ISSUE, Apr. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/
comptrol/fnotes/fnEnergy08/fnEnergy08.pdf)).
41. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 146 (“[A]side from the possibility of sporadic
application of federal statutes, control [of hydraulic fracturing] lies in the states.”).
42. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467,
1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
43. Id. at 1469–70 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 145.11(a)(5) (1997); 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)
(1994)).
44. Id. at 1471.
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not required.45 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, citing the dictionary
definition of “injection,” meaning “the act of ‘forc[ing] (a fluid) into
a passage, cavity, or tissue.’”46 In the court’s view, it did not matter
that the wells were used primarily for producing gas; they “injected”
fluids underground and so should be regulated under the statute.47
LEAF won the suit, but the victory was short-lived. In 2005,
Congress “conclusively withdrew frac[k]ing from the realm of federal
regulation” by passing the Energy Policy Act, which “exempted all
frac[k]ing with the exception of diesel fuel from the definition of
underground injection in Section 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water
Act.”48
Since Congress passed the Act, fracking has remained almost
entirely state-regulated. Calls for more federal control, however,
appear to have hit home with some politicians. At the direction of
Congress, EPA scientists have commenced a study of hydraulic
fracturing’s potential effects on groundwater and drinking water.49
The study’s purpose “is to understand the relationship between
hydraulic fracturing and drinking water resources” and will include
“the full lifespan of water” in the fracking process.50
The EPA’s conclusions could prompt other federal agencies to
take regulatory action. The Department of Energy is already in the
process of drafting consensus advice to federal regulators on best
practices for shale extraction,51 and Department of Interior Secretary
Ken Salazar has indicated his Agency may adopt a chemical
disclosure requirement for all fracking fluids used on public lands.52

45. Id.
46. Id. at 1474.
47. Id. at 1475.
48. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 145.
49. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’s Draft Hydraulic Fracturing Study Plan,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/index.cfm
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2011).
50. Id.
51. See Natural Gas Subcomm. of the Sec’y of Energy Advisory Bd., Dept. of Energy,
Improving the Safety & Environmental Performance of Hydraulic Fracturing (Sep. 2, 2011),
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/index.html.
52. See Matthew H. Ahrens et al., Client Alert: Hydraulic Fracturing: Potential for
Increased Federal and State Oversight, LATHAM & WATKINS ENVTL., LAND & RES. DEP’T
(Dec.
6,
2010),
available
at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/
pub3832_1.pdf.
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III. LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND STATE
RESPONSES
A. Legal Issues
Despite the financial rewards to developers, hydrofracking does
implicate several legal issues, including questions about trespass,
pooling, ownership, and damages.53
1. Trespass
Although few courts have addressed the issue in full, one widely
debated question is whether fracking that extends across property
lines should be considered an actionable trespass. The Texas
Supreme Court essentially said no in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust,54 the seminal case on the subject.
In Coastal Oil, the plaintiffs, a group of mineral owners, brought
suit against their lessee, Coastal, after it drilled and fracked a
producing well on an adjacent property.55 The well was drilled just
467 feet from the boundary of the owners’ tract, and they thought it
was draining gas from under their lands.56 Coastal admitted that its
fracking fluids and proppants probably reached beyond the boundary
line, but the parties disagreed on whether the owners suffered any
actual drainage.57 The Texas Supreme Court held that the owners’
trespass claim was barred by the rule of capture, which “gives a
mineral rights owner title to the oil and gas produced from a lawful
well bottomed on the property, even if the oil and gas flowed to the
well from beneath another owner’s tract.”58 Thus, the court
concluded, any gas that the owners supposedly lost did not actually
belong to them.59
The court went further than any other in actually addressing the
fracking-trespass question, though one observer has complained that
“[b]y using the rule of capture . . . the court avoided directly
answering whether hydraulic fracturing resulted in a claim for

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

1752
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268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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trespass.”60 This point is arguably moot, however, since every oiland gas-producing state adheres to the rule.61 Because Texas is the
standard-bearer on oil and gas issues, it seems likely that other courts
facing that question will follow the Coastal Oil analysis.62 Some states
may even go a step further. States like Louisiana and California, for
example, follow a “non-ownership” theory of oil and gas interests.63
In such jurisdictions, no owner holds title to any oil and gas, but
merely a right to drill for it.64 Assuming statutory provisions have not
altered the common law theory,65 these states seem highly unlikely to
ever uphold a trespass claim against a fracking company.66
2. Pooling
Hydraulic fracturing can also raise pooling issues. Pooling refers
to the combining of small tracts to create a single tract large enough
to obtain a well permit.67 The purpose of pooling “is to prevent the
physical and economic waste that accompanies the drilling of
unnecessary wells.”68 A leading opinion that addresses pooling issues
related to fracked wells is Hegarty v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, a
complicated case involving the proper allocation of production from
60. Maxwell, supra note 6, at 355.
61. Patrick H. Martin, Campanile Professor of Mineral Law, Law Ctr., La. State Univ.,
Presentation at University of Texas School of Law, First Oil, Gas and Mineral Law “Boot
Camp,” The Rule of Capture, Correlative Rights, and Principles of Conservation 1 (March 26,
2009), available at http://www.utcle.org/eLibrary/preview.php?asset_file_id=20109 (partial
version).
62. See Maxwell, supra note 6, at 362 (“Ultimately, other states and operators will likely
look to Texas for guidance . . . as Texas has always been at the forefront of oil and gas law.”).
63. Martin, supra note 61, at 1.
64. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1009
(2008). Sprankling compares this right to that of a fisherman. The fisherman may have a
license to fish but does not acquire title to any particular fish until reeling it in. Id.
65. See id. at 1010 (“Today these common law rules are increasingly modified by
statutes that promote governmental intervention in oil and gas production at the expense of
traditional property rights.”).
66. Ironically, Texas is among the states that follow an “ownership-in-place” theory,
which allows an owner to actually hold title to oil and gas and consider it part of the real
property lying below the surface. Id. at 1009. The owner’s title is nonetheless held subject to
the rule of capture, id., which helps explain the court’s ruling in Coastal Oil. Theoretically,
ownership-in-place states would be more likely than non-ownership states to uphold trespass
claims, although the Coastal Oil opinion shows the kind of uphill battle plaintiffs will likely face
in any jurisdiction.
67. PATRICK MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 901 (2010).
68. Id.
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coalbed methane wells.69 Coalbed methane is produced by extracting
gas through cracks in coal seams, making hydraulic fracturing an
integral part of the drilling process.70 Hegarty is useful not simply as
a discussion of pooling as it relates to fractured wells, but also as an
illustration of the complications that can arise when federal and state
oil and gas laws overlap.
In Hegarty, a methane gas company obtained approval from the
State of Utah to drill a well on state land.71 The well’s spacing unit72
was to be 160 acres, 65.7% of which lay under one family’s property
located across the boundary line of the state land.73 The company
tried unsuccessfully to lease the family members’ mineral interests
but never offered them a chance to participate in drilling the well.74
The company continued to drill other wells, one of which also
drained gas from under the family’s property.75 Before the wells were
drilled, a federal unit had been formed which encompassed both the
family’s and the state’s land.76 The unit allowed mineral owners to
voluntarily pool their interests,77 giving each owner participating in
the unit a proportionate share of production from all unit wells.78
The family members had initially elected “not to commit their lands
to the unit,” but when they suspected that drainage was occurring
they petitioned the Utah Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining for

69. 57 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2002).
70. Id. at 1044.
71. Id. at 1045.
72. The spacing unit, or “drainage field,” is the area, allocated by regulation, from
which a single well can be expected to drain gas. See id. at 1044.
73. Id. at 1045.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1046.
76. Id. at 1044. Although many of the lands in the unit were privately or state-owned,
30 U.S.C. § 226 allows for “tracts containing sufficient federal lands” to be developed as a
federal unit. Id. at 1047.
77. The federal unitization and pooling statute makes participation in the unit
completely voluntary on the part of nonfederal owners. Thus, “if a non-federal owner chooses
not to commit his land to a federal exploratory unit, then that owner must on his own find
other ways of protecting his correlative rights.” Id. The term “correlative rights” is defined as
“the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable share of oil and gas
in a pool without waste.” Id. at 1048 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(2) (West 2010)).
78. Id. at 1044, 1048. The share of each owner is based on the number of acres he or
she owns in relation to all acreage in the unit, meaning that in federal units each owner shares
in the production from all unit wells. Id. at 1048. The Utah pooling statute, on the other
hand, gives owners “their percentage of the drainage field of an individual well,” meaning it is
designed to allow “for participation on an individual well basis.” Id. at 1048–49.

1754

DO NOT DELETE

1743

11/10/2011 5:33 PM

Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spotty” Regulation

retroactive spacing and pooling orders.79 The board issued the orders
but denied retroactivity.80 On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the board’s denial, noting that “parties in possession of the
necessary information to act in protection of their own rights bear
the responsibility for doing so.”81 Since the family members had
sufficient knowledge of the two wells to seek pooling long before
they petitioned the board, it would be unjust to grant them “the
share of production that they failed to secure for themselves by
timely action.”82
As in Coastal Oil, the draining in Hegarty was partly a product of
hydraulic fracturing,83 which makes the questions of how far onto
the family’s land the fractures extended and exactly how much gas
migrated across the tract’s boundary difficult to answer. Perhaps the
more interesting aspect of the case, however, is the interplay of state
and federal law.84
Utah law allows for forced pooling of mineral interests, but only
if an interested party first asks the board for a spacing order.85 The
federal pooling statute, on the other hand, is completely voluntary.86
In Hegarty, the company naturally saw no need to seek either
voluntary or forced pooling because, as a unit participant, it could do
nothing and still receive a proportionate share of the proceeds from
all unit wells while sharing its own drilling costs with other unit
participants.87 As the court put it, the company “had no duty to act
contrary to its own interests by seeking another layer of

79. Id. at 1044, 1046.
80. Id. at 1046.
81. Id. at 1051–52.
82. Id. at 1051.
83. See id. at 1044.
84. “The interaction of federal and state law on a single oil and gas field” was a topic
that neither the Utah Supreme Court nor any “other court in the United States” had
previously addressed. Id. at 1047. The conflicts between federal and state law in Hegarty are
indicative of the types of questions that additional federal regulation of hydrofracking would
undoubtedly create as states struggle to reconcile conflicting and overlapping federal and state
rules.
85. Id. at 1048.
86. Id. at 1047.
87. See id. at 1048 (“[T]he Federal Act does not formally mandate uniform spacing
throughout the field. Therefore, participants share in production based on their percentage of
acreage ownership of the committed lands in the whole unit, rather than their percentage of
the drainage field of an individual well.”).
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regulation.”88 Theoretically, if there had been no federal unit, the
company would still not have been required to apply for spacing and
pooling orders for its two wells, but Utah operators commonly seek
spacing orders before drilling in order “to prevent uncommitted
owners from riding the well down free without paying a share of
[the] costs.”89 Thus, without the federal statute and federal unit, the
family would probably not have missed out on initial production
from the two wells. In this case, the presence of federal lands made
the statutory conflict arguably unavoidable. It is not difficult,
however, to imagine less necessary federal-state conflicts arising
should Congress decide to promulgate more fracking regulations.
3. Ownership
Fracking-related ownership questions usually focus on who owns
the oil or gas targeted by drilling operations.90 However, because
operators often contract with other parties for fracking services, tax
and related liability issues also arise.
In BJ–Titan Services v. State Tax Commission, for example, the
Utah Supreme Court held that well operators do not purchase
tangible personal property, and therefore incur no sales or use tax
liability, when they pay another company to frack a well.91 The court
acknowledged that fracking requires chemicals to be “injected into
the well to stimulate well flow and returned as part of production
when oil and other fluids are taken from the well.”92 But since the
value of such injection to the operator “lies purely in the service, not
in the chemicals,” the court concluded that “there is no real transfer
of possession or ownership of the chemicals.”93
Though the opinion focused on ownership for tax purposes, it
may have implications for lawsuits against well operators. If operators
who do not frack their own wells fail to acquire ownership of
fracking fluids for tax purposes, they may argue that only fracking
companies should be liable for any damage to water or surface lands
88. Id. at 1052.
89. ABA Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Prod. Comm., Annual Report, 2002
ENV’T ENERGY & RES. L. YEAR REV. 90, 114.
90. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 450 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(determining ownership of coalbed gas), rev’d, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
91. 842 P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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caused by the fluids (absent, of course, any negligence on the part of
the operator after the frack job has been completed).94
4. Damages
Establishing damages can get particularly complicated when
hydraulic fracturing is involved. As the Texas Supreme Court
explained:
[D]etermining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic
fracturing is the kind of issue the litigation process is least equipped
to handle. One difficulty is that the material facts are hidden below
miles of rock, making it difficult to ascertain what might have
happened. Such difficulty in proof is one of the justifications for the
rule of capture.95

Perhaps equally important, however, is the desire of some judges to
avoid discouraging fracking operations, which have become a crucial
element of many producing states’ economies. Thus, for both
evidentiary and economic reasons, suits against fracking companies
and their operators may be slightly less likely than other tort claims
to result in large damage awards. This is a reality the Coastal Oil
court applauded:
[S]ocial policies, industry operations, and the greater good . . . are
all tremendously important in deciding whether frac[k]ing should
or should not be against the law. . . The experts in this case agree
on two important things. One is that hydraulic fracturing is not
optional; it is essential to the recovery of oil and gas in many
areas . . . . The other is that hydraulic fracturing cannot be
performed both to maximize reasonable commercial effectiveness
and to avoid all drainage. Some drainage is virtually unavoidable. In

94. Admittedly, courts may view this argument as a stretch, and either way it would
depend on whether the fracking company was acting as the operator’s agent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“[T]he employer of an independent
contractor is [generally] not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of
the contractor or his servants.”).
95. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2008); see
also Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 235 (Tex. 1955) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (“Under our law no one has a right simply to capture the property of someone else.
But because of early difficulty in determining the source of oil produced from a well we
stopped judicial inquiry at the mouth of the well, called it the rule of capture, and said that
adjoining landowners could protect themselves by going and doing likewise. Admittedly this
was a matter of expediency, and in the then state of the oil business and the then knowledge of
reservoir dynamics, it reached a practical result.”).
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this context, common law liability for a long-used practice essential
to an industry is ill-advised . . . .96

Each of these legal issues presents a challenge for courts and
offers fodder for academic discussion. By and large, however,
proponents of federal regulation appear far more motivated by
environmental concerns than by a desire to bring states into
alignment on fracking-related legal questions like trespass and
pooling. In fact, some scholars view additional federal controls as
necessary only because common law claims like trespass and nuisance
often fail, in their opinion, to fully address fracking’s far more
dangerous environmental effects.97
B. Environmental Concerns
Much of the research regarding the potential environmental
concerns arising from hydraulic fracturing focuses on water issues. A
2004 EPA study outlined various production activities having the
potential to injure water quality and quantity, including “surface
discharge of fracturing and production fluids, aquifer/formation
dewatering, water withdrawal from production wells, methane
migration through conduits created by drilling and fracturing
practices, or any combination of these.”98 Since the most challenging
fracking questions deal with contamination that cannot be observed,
this Section limits its discussion to fracking fluids and methane
migration.
1. Fracking fluids
Environmental groups are especially concerned with the fracking
fluids being used by developers, which the Natural Resource Defense
Council asserts “are likely to contain toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals.”99 A question generating much debate is whether these
96. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 16.
97. See Wiseman, supra note 16, at 156.
98. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE
RESERVOIRS, EPA 816-R-04-003 at 6-16 (2004) [hereinafter EPA 2004 Study], available at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch06_water_qual_
incidents.pdf.
99. NATURAL RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED
METHANE WELLS: A THREAT TO DRINKING WATER 2 (2002), available at http://
www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/200201_NRDC_HydrFrac_CBM.pdf.
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chemicals regularly make their way into sources of drinking water.
Fracking opponents argue that they do, and that the effects on those
using the water are appalling.100
One Colorado resident, for example, testified before a
congressional committee in 2007 that when gas wells were drilled
near his home, a water well on a neighbor’s property exploded, and
101
sand built up in his own water filter. “If we set a glass of water out
overnight,” the man testified, “a thin oily film would float on top.
We stopped drinking it.”102 The water contamination allegedly gave
his wife “burning eyes and nosebleeds,” as well as “fatigue,
headaches, hand numbness, bloody stools, rashes, welts and blisters
on her skin.”103
Perhaps the most troublesome of all hydrofracking practices
involves the use of diesel fuel as a fracturing fluid.104 Diesel “may
contain known carcinogens,” including benzene, toluene,
ethylbenzene, and xylenes.105 Such compounds make the use of
diesel fuel especially dangerous because, as the EPA noted, they
exceed the maximum contaminant levels allowed in underground
sources of drinking water under federal law “at the point-of-injection
(i.e. the subsurface location where fracturing fluids are initially
injected).”106
As a result, diesel fuel is the only fracking fluid regulated by the
EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act.107 In addition, the three
major U.S. fracturing companies (who together perform ninety-five
percent of all fracking jobs in the country) entered into an agreement
with the EPA “to eliminate diesel fuel from hydraulic fracturing
fluids injected directly into [underground sources of drinking water]

100. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 138.
101. Curtis Hewston, A Death in Colorado, THE BLUE HIGHWAY (Jan. 26, 2011, 2:17
PM), http://thebluehighway.com/?p=2125 (last visited Sep. 9, 2011).
102. Id.
103. Id. See also Wiseman, supra note 16, at 138–39 (summarizing this same testimony).
104. See Wiseman, supra note 16, at 139 (“[T]here is a strong consensus against one
practice: frac[k]ing with diesel fuel.”).
105. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-4, 4-11, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
106. Id. at 4-11.
107. See 42 U.S.C. §300h(d)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘underground injection’ . . .
excludes . . . the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels)
pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production
activities.” (emphasis added)).
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to stimulate coalbed methane production.”108 In early 2011, several
members of Congress accused the companies of violating the
agreement when disclosures showed that diesel is still being used as a
fracking fluid.109 It is unclear, however, whether it has been used in
any fracturing applications in or near drinking water sources.110
2. Methane contamination
Fracking fluids are not the only potential source of
contamination. A number of critics fear that hydraulic fracturing
causes “connections between coal formation[s] and underground
water sources.”111 Articles in recent years have revealed a “string of
documented cases of gas escaping into drinking water,”112 which
some local governments say can be linked to increased gas drilling
(though studies are not conclusive).113 Investigators found methane
in the drinking water of a Pennsylvania resident’s home in 2009, for
example, after an explosion occurred in her basement when she was
not home.114 Gas operators had been drilling just a few hundred
yards from her house at the time.115 Other residents in the area
reported water well explosions, and the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection eventually charged a gas operator with
regulatory violations involving faulty well casings.116
108. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-19, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
109. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Fracking Companies Injected 32M Gallons of Diesel, House
Probe Finds, CITIZENS FOR A HEALTHY COMMUNITY (Jan. 31, 2011), http://
citizensforahealthycommunity.org/news/news-fracking-companies-injected-32m-gallons-ofdiesel-house-probe-finds.
110. Id.
111. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 142.
112. Abrahm Lustgarten, Officials in Three States Pin Water Woes on Gas Drilling,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/officials-inthree-states-pin-water-woes-on-gas-drilling-426.
113. See, e.g., GEOFFREY THYNE, REVIEW OF PHASE II HYDROGEOLOGIC STUDY FOR
GARFIELD COUNTY 2–3 (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/
assets/methane/thyne_review.pdf (Garfield County, Colorado study noting a trend of
increasing methane and chloride levels in groundwater “coincident with [an] increased number
of gas wells” but also noting that values are still “below regulatory limits” and that “[t]he
number of water wells . . . and their spatial distribution is inadequate to monitor and locate
potential source of contamination from the more than 1400 potential point sources . . . .”).
114. Lustgarten, supra note 112.
115. Id.
116. Id. As Lustgarten’s article describes, “drilling companies insert as many as three
concentric rings of steel pipes inside the well bore to isolate what flows through them. . . .
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In its 2004 study, the EPA noted that citizens in Wyoming,
Montana, Alabama, Virginia, West Virginia, Colorado, and New
Mexico had contacted the Agency with concerns that coalbed
methane production had affected their water wells.117 Many of the
complaints were limited to water loss, but citizens also described
water well contamination and increased methane levels inside
homes.118
The environmental concerns have prompted a push among legal
scholars and interest groups for more federal regulatory
intervention.119 One group, for example, calls the exemption of
fracking fluids from the Safe Drinking Water Act “bad environmental
policy.”120 And EarthWorks has criticized the decision as “making oil
and gas the only industry allowed to inject toxic fluids directly into
good quality groundwater without oversight by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.”121
What is conspicuously missing from many of these groups’
arguments, however, is an explanation of how and why federal
regulation will actually diminish fracking’s environmental risks. In
fact, a closer look at much of the rhetoric against a state-centric
regulatory system reveals not so much a push for federal regulation,
but rather for federal prohibition of hydraulic fracturing.122 Perhaps
[W]here extra protection is needed . . . concrete is pumped into the gap between the rings of
pipe to ensure an impenetrable seal.” Id. When this casing and cementing is done correctly,
“the issue of groundwater contamination, whether from gas or hydraulic fracturing, goes
away.” Id. Thus, it appears these Pennsylvania incidents had more to do with the operator’s
violations of standard casing regulations than with anything related specifically to hydraulic
fracturing.
117. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-1, 6-2, available at http://
www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch06_water_qual_incidents.pdf.
118. Id. at 6-2 to 6-5, 6-9 to 6-11, 6-13.
119. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 16, at 145 (“Several environmental groups have
continued to push for federal regulation . . . .”); Cupas, supra note 16.
120. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 145 (quoting THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, TOO WILD
TO DRILL: HYDRAULIC FRACTURING THREATENS DRINKING WATER).
121. EARTHWORKS, OIL & GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING,
available at http:// www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/Fracking.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Hydraulic Fracturing, ‘Fracking,’ Banned In Buffalo, NY, REUTERS, Feb.
9, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/09/hydraulic-fracturingbann_n_820647.html (reporting that opponents have succeeded in getting fracking banned in
several U.S. cities, including Buffalo and Pittsburgh); Brian Tumulty, ‘Gasland’ director calls
for natural gas moratorium, PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Feb. 18, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://www.pressconnects.com/article/20110218/NEWS01/102180305/-Gaslanddirector-calls-natural-gas-moratorium (reporting that Josh Fox, the director of “Gasland,” an
Academy Award-nominated documentary about fracking, has asked President Obama for a
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this is because, by and large, state control of hydrofracking is already
relatively expansive.
C. Increasing State Controls
As fracking has become more widespread, state regulation of the
practice has intensified, although specific rules vary widely.123 Some
see this variation as a reason for more federal control.124 But as the
following discussion illustrates, every producing state has
promulgated a considerable amount of fracking regulation, whether
through general permitting processes or more directly.125
Wyoming, for example, was the first state to require companies
to fully disclose the chemicals used in their fracking fluids.126 The
state also requires drillers to give notice to surface owners of planned
oil and gas operations on their lands and make good faith efforts to
enter into “surface use agreements” that will protect surface
resources, provide for reclamation of disturbed areas, and determine
a payment for any damages caused by the operations.127 Developers
must show that they have complied with this requirement before the

nationwide fracking moratorium).
123. MARK ZOBACK ET AL., BRIEFING PAPER 1: ADDRESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS
FROM
SHALE
GAS
DEVELOPMENT
13
(2010),
available
at
http://efdsystems.org/Portals/25/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20Paper%20%20World%20Watch.pdf.
124. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 16, at 167 (“The varying complexity and breadth of
state oil and gas regulations suggests that some states are not adequately protecting
underground sources of drinking water – sources that are of federal concern – from the impacts
of frac[k]ing.”). Professor Wiseman comes dangerously close to mischaracterizing the current
state of fracking regulation in her article. “[S]ome [states] decline to regulate,” she states in
her introduction. Id. at 116. As support for this assertion, she quotes a line from the Coastal
Oil opinion, which, in reality, refers, not to a general lack of fracking regulation in the U.S.,
but rather to a single state agency’s decision to regulate fracking indirectly through general
permitting procedures. Id. (quoting Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268
S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008)). She acknowledges this fact much later in her article, id. at 157, but
her original statement seems inappropriately misleading in light of the numerous provisions
adopted in every producing state that significantly limit what fracking companies can do.
125. The purpose of this Section is not to provide a comprehensive review of every
producing state’s oil and gas regulations. Rather, what follows is intended to illustrate both the
variety of state approaches to fracking issues and the heightened scrutiny with which most state
regulatory bodies now view the practice.
126. See Dustin Bleizeffer, Wyoming Approves ‘Fracking’ Disclosure Rules, TRIB.COM,
Jun. 9, 2010, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_069139a4-5b9b-51c3-a599a38f788e8ff4.html (reporting that state regulators in 2010 approved rules “requiring oil and
gas companies to disclose chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing”).
127. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402 (2010).
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Wyoming Oil and Gas Commission will grant a permit to drill128 or a
permit to construct a pit for retaining fluids.129 Moreover, before any
well can be used for injection activities, an operator must
demonstrate to the Commission that its casing is leak-proof and able
to withstand pressures of at least 300 pounds per square inch.130
New York has perhaps the nation’s strictest fracking controls.
Shortly before leaving office in late 2010, former governor David
Paterson “issued an executive order imposing a moratorium on
permits for horizontal wells and instruct[ed] the [Department of
Environmental Conservation] to revise its draft of standards
governing the use of high-volume fracking.”131 In July of 2011, the
Agency released a revised Draft Supplemental Generic
Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS) which recommended that
the moratorium be kept in place in certain areas and lifted in others,
subject to strict regulation.132
Even without the moratorium, the state’s rules are far from
lenient. An operator seeking to drill needs to submit an application
for a permit, pay a permit fee, offer a description of the planned
drilling project, provide three copies of a plat, and complete an
Environmental Assessment Form.133 This form “provides information
about the physical setting of the proposed project, the general
character of the land and land use, the projected size of the area that
will be disturbed and the length of time the drilling rig will be on the

128.
129.
130.
131.

055-003 WYO. CODE R. § 8(d) (2011).
055-004 WYO. CODE R. § 1(d) (2011).
Id. at § 8.
Bonner R. Cohen, Outgoing New York Governor Fires Final Shot on Fracking,
HEARTLANDER,
Feb.
7,
2011,
http://www.heartland.org/full/29294/
Outgoing_New_York_Governor_Fires_Final_Shot_on_Fracking.html.
132. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FACT SHEET: 2011
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PERMITTING HIGH-VOLUME HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NEW
YORK STATE (July 2011), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/
sgeisgenfs092011.pdf. Specifically, the SGEIS recommends prohibiting drilling within the
Syracuse and New York City watersheds, and within 2000 feet of public drinking water
supplies, among other areas. Where fracking is allowed, the report recommends requiring
additional well casing to prevent gas migration and imposing limits on withdrawals from
surface water bodies. It also recommends new rules governing chemical disclosure and requires
operators to get DEC approval before disposing of flowback water. Id.
133. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, WELL PERMITTING PROCESS: WELL
PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS TO DRILL, DEEPEN, PLUG BACK AND CONVERT FOR OIL, GAS,
SOLUTION SALT MINING AND OTHER REGULATED WELLS (2011), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1772.html.
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site.”134 A Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and
additional permits may also be necessary.135 Even Professor Wiseman
calls the state’s fracking rules “relatively comprehensive.”136
She says the same about Pennsylvania, even though the state uses
general oil and gas rules to regulate fracking.137 Strong permitting
requirements compel operators to account for any water sources or
coal seams near drilling sites,138 and the Department of
Environmental Protection may deny permits that would violate any
applicable environmental law.139 The state also has separate rules for
exploration activities in the Marcellus Shale.140
Likewise, Colorado has adopted comprehensive fracking
regulations. In 2009, the state overhauled its rules, providing more
protections against methane contamination.141 Even before the
overhaul, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(COGCC) instituted a “mitigation program” to seal improperly
abandoned wells. The program resulted in a reduction of methane
concentrations in close to 30% of all sampled water wells.142 More
recently, the Commission has begun investigating the use of diesel
fuel in fracking operations and regularly testing groundwater wells
for contamination.143 The COGCC also requires operators to
maintain a “Chemical Inventory” of all chemicals used in drilling and
completion, including fracturing, at each well site.144
The Alabama Oil and Gas Board claims that it “investigates every
complaint it receives.”145 A unique feature of its investigations is that
each one includes research regarding “historical water quality
134. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DIVISION OF MINERAL RESOURCES
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FORM (EAF) FOR WELL PERMITTING (2011), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1777.html.
135. Id.
136. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 116.
137. Id. at 116, 163.
138. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.201(b) (2010).
139. Id. at 201(e)(1).
140. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 163.
141. Lustgarten, supra note 112.
142. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-5.
143. Press Releaase, Dep’t of Natural Res., State of Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm’n, New Website to Provide Data on Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals in Colorado (Apr.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://dnr.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/News/
Fracking%20disclosure.pdf.
144. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205.c (2011).
145. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-11.
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data.”146 As the EPA explains, this “information is important because
the coal-bearing Pottsville Formation often contains high
concentrations of iron.”147 The symptoms of iron staining, which can
occur suddenly and “in water with a history of good quality,” are
apparently similar to those of methane contamination.148 Such
observations show the importance of accounting for regional
characteristics in fracking regulations.
Perhaps more than any other state, Texas has been criticized for
its fracking regulations, primarily because until recently no rule
addressed the practice specifically.149 That changed in June of 2011,
when Texas governor Rick Perry signed into law H.B. 3328, which
requires operators to publicly disclose chemicals used in fracturing
applications.150 Even without the legislation, much of the criticism of
Texas is misplaced, since, as Professor Wiseman herself admits, many
of the state’s general oil and gas regulations “apply to various
components of the frac[k]ing process.”151 Like other states, operators
cannot drill without a permit,152 and they must obtain a Water Board
Letter from the state Commission on Environmental Quality setting
out “the depth to which fresh water must be protected” for each
well.153 No operator in the state “may dispose of any oil and gas
wastes [which would include fracking fluids] by any method without
obtaining a permit.”154 In addition, the state has extensive casing and
cementing regulations, including requirements that all casing be
146. Id. at 6-11.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 6-10 to 6-12. The EPA study does not explicitly compare the symptoms of
iron staining to that of methane contamination. It notes, however, that complaints about
methane contamination have included reports of “black coal fines,” unpleasant odors, oily
substances, and “jelly-like grease.” Id. at 6-10–6-11. Conversely, iron staining can result in
black stains, unpleasant odors, oily films, and “gelatinous material.” Id. at 6-12. The symptoms
seem sufficiently similar that misplaced complaints are at least possible (if not probable in some
cases).
149. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 16, at 116 (“In Texas . . . ‘neither the Legislature nor
the [Railroad] Commission has ever seen fit’ to regulate hydrofracturing.” (quoting Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008))).
150. H.B. 3328, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
151. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 157.
152. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5(a) (2011).
153. Barnett Shale Information: Top Questions Asked About the Barnett Shale, R.R.
COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.php#faqs (last updated
Aug. 4, 2011) (follow “Is an oil or gas operator required to perform an environmental study or
something similar?” link).
154. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(1) (2011).
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made of steel and “hydrostatically pressure tested,” and that “all
usable-quality water zones be isolated and sealed off to effectively
prevent contamination or harm.”155
Despite the peculiarities of each state’s regulatory system, almost
all share several common features. Every producing state, for
example, has “permitting requirements governing the locating,
drilling, completion, and operations of wells.”156 Almost all have
casing and cementing requirements designed to isolate ground water
from production zones.157 Every state but one requires regulatory
authorization before operators can leave a well idle.158 And all
twenty-seven producing states have regulations regarding the proper
plugging of wells.159
Given the level of scrutiny most states are already applying to
hydraulic fracturing, it is difficult to see how federal agencies could
significantly curb any of the few environmental effects left
unaddressed. Congress’s decision in 2005 to exempt most aspects of
fracking from federal regulation has been criticized as a “loophole”
for developers.160 But as the Independent Petroleum Association of
America states, “This characterization is entirely inaccurate;
Congress’ action merely keeps in place a system that has worked for
half a century.”161
IV. STATE-CENTRIC SOLUTIONS ARE BEST
A. Exaggerated Environmental Concerns
An initial reason to avoid the excesses of additional federal
regulation is that many of the environmental effects of hydraulic
fracturing appear to be overblown. As the EPA acknowledged, the
same water problems for which fracking is often blamed could easily
be caused by “naturally occurring conditions, population growth and
155. Id. at § 3.13(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
156. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED
TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 17 (2009), available at http://www.gwpc.org/elibrary/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Regulations%20Designed%20to%
20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf.
157. Id. at 19.
158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 26.
160. See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html.
161. INDEP. PETROLEUM ASS’N OF AM., supra note 13.

1766

DO NOT DELETE

1743

11/10/2011 5:33 PM

Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spotty” Regulation

historical practices.”162 In fact, a specialist with the State Department
of Environmental Conservation in New York has argued that
complaints regarding fracking stem more from “surface
mismanagement of frac[k]ing fluid than the actual fracturing of the
formation.”163
1. Fluid dilution
In its 2004 study, the EPA concluded that “the injection of
hydraulic fracturing fluids into coalbed methane wells poses little or
no threat to [underground sources of drinking water].”164 In fact,
“the largest portion of fracturing fluid constituents is nontoxic
(>95% by volume).”165 Of the portion that does contain
contaminants, “dilution and dispersion, adsorption, and potentially
biodegradation, minimize the possibility that chemicals included in
the fracturing fluids would adversely affect [underground sources of
drinking water].”166 The Agency was so confident in its findings that
it dismissed proposals for additional study of fracking as not worth
the expense.167
Part of the reason for the EPA’s confidence is the significant
amount of dilution that occurs before fracking fluids are ever
injected into a well. The EPA found that for every four to ten gallons
of fracking gel (which could include diesel fuel and other potentially
hazardous fluids as well as nonhazardous fluids) used in the drilling
process, companies mix in approximately 1,000 gallons of water.168
Such a mixture makes toxic substances like benzene, which has a
negligible presence in relation to the entire amount of fracking fluid
used,169 almost nonexistent by the time an operator finishes pumping
much of the fluid back to the surface.170
162. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-16.
163. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 141 (footnote omitted).
164. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 7-5, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf.
165. Id. at 7-3.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 7-5.
168. Id.
at
4-4,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
169. Id. (Benzene can comprise “between 0.003 percent to 0.1 percent by weight of
diesel fuel.”).
170. Id. at 4-14. At least one study predicted that between 68% and 82% of all fracking
fluids are eventually pumped back out of the well. Id. at 4-15.
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Moreover, aside from diesel fuel, the EPA does not consider
most fracking fluids to be environmentally hazardous. Often,
fracking gels consist of nothing more than “water or nitrogen foam”;
in some cases, “[w]ater with a simple sand proppant can be adequate
to achieve a desired fracture.”171 Numerous fracturing fluids contain
only harmless ingredients, and (other than diesel) even those with
potentially toxic additives simply do not contain contaminants “in
concentrations high enough to pose a significant threat.”172
2. Deep formations
Even if fracking fluids were highly toxic, they would still not
affect drinking water in many places because shales are generally
located thousands of feet below aquifers. The EPA found that
“[o]ften, a high stress contrast between adjacent geologic strata
results in a barrier to fracture propagation.”173 In other words,
fractures generally tend to remain within an operator’s target
formation. What this means in terms of most shale drilling is that the
chance of a fracture extending from the a well’s bottom hole location
to near-surface drinking water sources is infinitesimally small. As
Zoback notes, with only a few exceptions, “many thousands of feet
of rock separate most major gas-bearing shale formations in the
United States from the base of aquifers that contain drinkable
water.”174 In Ohio, for example, gas is often produced from nearly
3700 feet underground,175 and developers in Pennsylvania and
Colorado commonly drill down more than two miles to reach their
target depths.176
Of course, this is not always the case. Some shales, like the
Antrim in Michigan and the New Albany in Illinois, are relatively
shallow formations.177 Even then, methane migration can often be
traced to natural, preexisting cracks in underground rock.178 Such
171. Id.
at
4-19,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
172. Id. at 4-17.
173. Id.
at
7-5,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf.
174. ZOBACK, supra note 123, at 7.
175. Lustgarten, supra note 112.
176. Id.
177. ZOBACK, supra note 123, at 7.
178. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 7-5, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf.
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natural connections might create concern about fracking fluid
contamination, but, as the EPA noted, the effects of dilution,
recovery, and other factors significantly mitigates this threat.179
3. Individual complaints about fracking may be better explained by
other conditions
Despite the numerous complaints of water contamination
included in the EPA’s 2004 study, the Agency was not convinced
that they were all fracking-related.180 Other possible causes include
surface spills of drilling fluids and badly sealed or deserted wells.181
The COGCC, for example, believes that at least some of its methane
contamination problems have been caused by “old, improperly
abandoned” wells rather than by fracturing.182
Moreover, contamination can easily occur without any oil or gas
production. In many places, shallow water wells were already
producing methane or emitting strong sulfur odors before drilling
operations began.183 Past documented methane occurrences have led
the EPA to conclude that “natural fractures” rather than (or perhaps
in addition to) man-made fractures “probably serve as conduits”
from shallow coal formations to even shallower aquifers.184
Such findings should not be read to imply that every
hydrofracking complaint should be dismissed. On the contrary,
documented cases of methane contamination (like those in
Pennsylvania185) show signs of disturbing problems that only an
irresponsible operator would ignore. But while such incidents are
illustrative of the potential dangers involved in drilling near methane
deposits, they also serve as examples of what appear to be swift,
effective, appropriate, and, as far as can determined, typical state
responses to the dangers.186 These state responses further indicate
179. Id.
180. Id.
at
6-1,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch06_water_qual_incidents.pdf.
181. Id. at 6-1 to 6-2.
182. Id at 6-5.
183. Id. at 6-6.
184. Id. at 6-8.
185. See supra Part III.B.2.
186. See Lustgarten, supra note 112 (describing how, after several methane explosions in
Pennsylvania, the state’s “Department of Environmental Protection charged Cabot Oil & Gas
with two violations [of state rules] that it says caused the contamination”; and, after methane
levels rose in western Colorado, a county conducted an “exhaustive” study of the problem, and
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that additional federal intervention, while sure to be costly and
potentially problematic, would probably not contribute more than
state regulators already provide.
4. Defending the EPA’s 2004 study
With so much evidence in the EPA’s study pointing to both the
relative safety of hydraulic fracturing as well as the admirable work of
state regulatory bodies in dealing with its environmental concerns, it
seems only natural that fracking opponents would look for ways to
attack the report’s legitimacy. Some were less reasoned than others,
of course. Alan Septoff, writing for an EarthWorks blog, simply
declared that “[t]here’s ample reason to believe the 2004 study got
it wrong.”187 He called the report “a ‘get-out-of-enforcement-freecard’ for the drilling industry” and as support cited EarthWork’s own
review of the study, which, not surprisingly, also concluded that the
EPA got it wrong.188
Other critiques were more scholarly. Professor Wiseman, for
example, has attacked the EPA report as “too general to provide
adequate data,”189 possibly biased,190 possibly based on “bent” or
outcome-driven science,191 and possibly suffering from hidden or
omitted information.192 The operative word, of course, is “possibly,”
since there is little evidence to back up the accusations. She admits,
for example, that “there is no information suggesting that the
[EPA’s scientific and peer-review] panel was in fact biased.”193 And
the only instance of possible data “hiding” mentioned in her article
appears to be nothing more than a minor revision in the EPA
report.194

the state “overhauled” its oil and gas regulations).
187. Alan Septoff, EPA to Study Hydraulic Fracturing, Again. This Time (Hopefully) with
Science, EARTHWORKS EARTHBLOG (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://earthblog.org/
content/epa-study-hydraulic-fracturing-again-time-hopefully-science.
188. Id.
189. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 176.
190. Id. at 173.
191. Id. at 171.
192. Id. at 173.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 173–75. As the EPA explained, after industry feedback revealed an
inaccuracy in the Agency’s initial measures of fracking gel-water mixtures, it revised its pointof-injection concentration figures. Democrat Henry Waxman, then the ranking minority
member of the House Committee on Government Reform, attacked the revision as an
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In truth, the study was never designed to be scientifically
meticulous. Rather, as a “Phase I” analysis, evaluations of fracking’s
effect on drinking water were “conducted to provide the Agency
with information on whether a Phase II study [was] warranted.”195
Professor Wiseman acknowledges this, admitting that the details she
believes are lacking in the report “may have been too specific for an
EPA ‘Phase I study.’”196 What she and other critics ignore, however,
is that such a detailed study could only be financially justified if the
EPA’s “Phase I” evaluation had uncovered fracking problems
significant enough to warrant a second look. That was simply not the
case, yet fracking opponents continue to insist on conducting what
essentially amounts to another expensive197 fishing expedition. At
this point, it seems unlikely that even a second study that revealed no
new significant environmental concerns would satisfy those who
favor stricter federal controls.
Of course, not every complaint about fracking should be
dismissed. The legitimacy of environmentalists’ concerns about the
practice, however, does not demand, or even justify, additional
federal regulation.
B. Federal v. State: Why “Spotty” Regulation is Better Regulation
The push for more federal control of hydraulic fracturing seems
at least partly motivated by differences in state approaches to the
issue. Professor Wiseman, for example, argues that “[t]he varying
complexity and breadth of state oil and gas regulation suggests that
some states are not adequately protecting underground sources of
drinking water.”198 The flaw in such arguments, however, is that they

“alteration of the data,” complaining that the EPA’s explanation only exacerbated his concerns
that the agency was “altering, misusing, or ignoring technical data in a manner that benefits
Halliburton.” Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, H. Comm. on
Gov’t Reform, to Christine Todd Whitman, Adm’r, EPA (Oct. 8, 2002), available at
http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_EPA_Oct_8.pdf. In reality, the most
significant change effected by the revision was an adjustment of the high estimate of benzene
levels at the edge of a fracture zone from 8.46 µg/L to 2.62 µg/L—a reduction of less than 5
millionths of a gram per liter. Id.
195. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-1, available at http://www.epa.gov/
safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
196. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 176.
197. A new EPA fracking study, for example, would cost “more than $1.9 million.”
Septoff, supra note 187.
198. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 167.
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ignore the fact that the depth, accessibility, extraction techniques,
and characteristics of oil and gas reserves vary from state to state. In
fact, that fracking regulation in the United States has been
“spotty”199 may actually be a good thing.
1. Regional differences
In many respects, the more local and specialized the regulation,
the better. This is true primarily because oil and gas extraction
methods, and therefore hydrofracking techniques, are almost always
geologic- and region-specific.200 This fact makes additional federal
regulation unnecessary at best and potentially extremely problematic
if it conflicts with local and state land use controls.
The Texas Supreme Court hinted at this idea in the Coastal Oil
opinion.201 A major basis for the court’s decision was the desirability
of deferring to the Texas Railroad Commission on oil and gas
matters, especially where they involve questions of property
202
boundaries and extraction techniques within specific reserves. The
Commission has the luxury of focusing all its time and manpower on
oil and gas regulation (something the court lacks) and has sufficient
remedial authority to enforce its rules in a way that both protects
landowners203 and promotes “the state’s goals of preventing waste
and conserving natural resources.”204 Such realities make the
Commission, not the court, the appropriate entity for formulating
effective regulatory provisions.
For similar reasons, federal intervention into state regulation of
fracking seems unnecessary. Just as a commission’s staff of experts is
better equipped than judges to promulgate rules for state oil and gas
development, state officials are generally more informed about local
and regional production techniques than federal regulators.205 Not
199. Id. at 142.
200. See, e.g., PHI NGUYAN, WASHINGTON INTERNSHIPS FOR STUDENTS OF
ENGINEERING, REGULATORY OPTIONS & CHALLENGES IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 7
(2010) (“Shale deposits can be found throughout the United States—each in its own basin,
which is why operational criteria vary with each location.”).
201. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
202. Id. at 38–39.
203. As the court noted, “[n]o one suggests that these various remedies provide
inadequate protection against drainage.” Id. at 14.
204. Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change,
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only do many energy-producing states operate under somewhat
conflicting theories of oil and gas law,206 but the state commissions
that design rules that conform to those theories must be aware of the
location, form, and accessibility of their hydrocarbon reserves in
order to effectively regulate.
Of course, federal agencies can set up regional offices, and
federal regulators can familiarize themselves with local industry
realities, but federal employees will never be subject to the same kind
of political accountability as state officials, and this may make them
less receptive to local concerns. Perhaps more importantly, federal
officials remain bound by federal directives drawn up by bureaucrats
who reside far from most of the reserves their regulations affect.
Ironically, even proponents of federal regulation acknowledge
the need for region-specific fracking rules. Professor Wiseman notes
that, “[i]nvariably, effects will differ by region, by the type of
operation and disposal methods used, and the type of formation
frac[k]ed.”207 State officials are arguably more familiar with these
variables than federal employees, yet she promotes an additional,
potentially burdensome layer of federal control.208 This seems
shortsighted simply because what works well in one state may work
poorly in another.
This reality has long been a burr in the side of would-be federal
mining regulators. Despite widespread expansion of national
environmental protections throughout the twentieth century,209
Congress struggled to craft effective mining legislation. This was
primarily because geological and regional differences encouraged a

102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 592 (2008) (“Because state governments are more directly
accountable and more familiar with regional conditions, they are generally in a better position
than the federal government to make policy judgments for their constituencies.”).
206. For example, not all states adhere to the ownership-in-place theory. See supra notes
63–66 and accompanying text.
207. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 141.
208. Id. at 194.
209. This expansion began in the early 1900s, largely at the urging of Theodore
Roosevelt, who “did far more for the long-term protection of wilderness than all of his White
House predecessors combined.” DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR:
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 20 (2009). The federal
environmental movement picked up steam once again in the 1960s and 1970s with the passage
of the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), Clean Air Act (1970), Clean Water Act
(1972), Endangered Species Act (1973), Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), among others. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVTL SCI. 217
(David E. Alexander & Rhodes W. Fairbridge eds., 1999).
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state-centric regulatory scheme.210 A former government attorney
who helped draft the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 pointed out that coal regulation “differs significantly from
other federal environmental regulatory statutes” primarily because of
“the ‘diversity’ in coal mining areas.”211 This concern eventually
resulted in Congress admitting that “the primary governmental
authority for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing
[mining] regulations . . . should rest with the States.”212
Such diversity is even more apparent among oil and gas
formations. A comparison of operations in the Bakken Shale with
those in the Barnett Shale is illustrative. Bakken companies primarily
drill for oil,213 while Barnett operators produce gas.214 Typical
spacing in the Bakken can be as much as 1280 acres per well,215 as
opposed to Barnett spacing, which rarely exceeds 100 acres.216 This,
of course, creates far fewer wells in the Bakken states and thus a
better opportunity to avoid drilling near communities. Likewise,
Bakken states (Montana and North Dakota) are largely rural to begin
with, making land use decisions simpler and disputes regarding
property lines and leasehold interests less common.
Even the use of fracking fluids varies widely by field and
formation. As the EPA noted, “[o]n any one fracturing job, different
fluids may be used in combination or alone at different stages in the
fracturing process. Experienced service company engineers will devise
the most effective fracturing scheme, based on formation
210. Edward M. Green, State and Federal Roles Under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 531, 535–36 (1997).
211. Id. at 535.
212. Id. at 535–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f)
(1994)).
213. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, 3 to 4.3 Billion Barrels of Technically
Recoverably Oil Assessed in N.D. & Mont.’s Bakken Formation—25 Times More Than 1995
Estimate (Apr.
10,
2008),
available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/
article.asp?ID=1911.
214. Marc Airhart, The Barnett Shale Gas Boom, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/
research/barnett-shale-gas.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
215. See FAQ’s, N.D. PETROLEUM COUNCIL, http://www.ndoil.org/?id=77&offset=55
(under question “How does horizontal drilling affect the environment?”) (last visited Mar. 1,
2011) (“The typical new Bakken well uses a 5 acre surface location that is reclaimed to about
two acres for production to develop 1,280 acres of minerals.”).
216. See JEFF HAYDEN & DAVE PURSELL, PICKERING ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., THE
BARNETT SHALE: VISITORS GUIDE TO THE HOTTEST GAS PLAY IN THE US 27 (2005),
available
at
http://www.tudorpickering.com/Websites/tudorpickering/Images/
Reports%20Archives/TheBarnettShaleReport.pdf.
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characteristics, using the fracturing fluid combination they deem
most effective.”217 Fracking companies in Montana, for example,
“have been using relatively non-intrusive fluids—mostly a gel water
sand frac[k], with the gel consisting of a drilling mud or a
polymer.”218 In Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale, on the other hand,
there have been reports of higher than expected levels of radiation in
wastewater from fracked wells.219
Arguments for more federal intervention consistently fail to
account for these realities. Professor Wiseman writes, for example,
that an “absence of regulation [would] not [be] of great concern if
frac[k]ing [were] a relatively benign practice that c[ould] be
sufficiently controlled through the general permitting process; but if
frac[k]ing has significant environmental and public health impacts,
the lack of regulation is problematic.”220 The problem with such an
all-or-nothing analysis is that fracking is both benign and
environmentally hazardous—depending on its location.221 In some
states, the general permitting process provides adequate
environmental protections; in others, more stringent rules are
justified.222 But these are decisions that ought to be left to state
policymakers and state regulatory agencies, not federal employees
who may be ignorant to specific local and regional practices and may
thus rely on articles like Wiseman’s, which downplay the importance
of geological dissimilarities and variations in fracking technique.
With state regulations already providing extensive environmental
protections, additional federal fracking controls, in all likelihood, can
217. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-2, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/
uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
218. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 141 (citations omitted).
219. Don Hopey & Daniel Malloy, Radiation in Fracking Fluid Is a New Concern,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 2011, at A.1.
220. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 116.
221. Of course, this is not the only problem with Professor Wiseman’s statement. As
noted above, to characterize any producing state’s approach to fracking as an “absence” of
regulation borders on bold-faced propaganda. See supra Part III.C.
222. In states such as Pennsylvania, for example, where permitting rules incorporate other
environmental regulations and require operators to account for water resources near drill sites,
additional fracking-specific requirements would arguably be unnecessary. See supra notes 137–
39 and accompanying text. The same could be said for states like Montana, where urban
drilling is rarely a concern and operators use nonintrusive fracking fluids. See supra notes 215,
218 and accompanying text. On the other hand, in areas where fracturing could significantly
interfere with crucial land and water use plans—as it might within the New York and Syracuse
watersheds—public health concerns may demand separate rules for fracked wells. See supra
note 132 and accompanying text.
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have only one of two effects: either (1) they will “have little impact,”
representing “no more than ideological tinkering with state law”;223
or (2) they will alter the entire state-centric system, essentially
voiding many workable state rules, creating overlapping controls that
slow down domestic oil and gas production, and producing uniform
standards for fracking techniques that ought to vary by field and
region.
Should Congress opt for such a uniform system, the safest route
would be to force all states to adopt stringent fracking rules. The
problem is that while such regulations might be appropriate and
welcomed in New York, they could be unnecessarily restrictive in
states like Montana and North Dakota. At the same time, crafting a
middle-of-the-road national standard could send the message that
stricter requirements are unnecessary.224
2. Federal regulatory failures
Obviously, only a shortsighted system would fail to account for
at least some regional and geological differences. But even if each
state’s reserves were identical, no evidence suggests that federal
fracking regulation would be superior to state control. In fact, the
BP spill and other recent energy industry problems have created
concerns that the entire federal energy regulatory machine is simply
too large, and too politically dominated, to be effective.225
As the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill
and Offshore Drilling described, from its outset “federal regulation
of offshore drilling awkwardly combined” two competing
priorities—environmental protection and energy independence—
which were often difficult to reconcile “as a series of Congresses,
223. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
224. Similarly, some commentators have questioned the desirability of allowing states
that prefer more stringent regulation to ratchet up their rules beyond federal minimum
standards but at the same time prohibiting those that prefer less regulation to ratchet down
their own. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261, 292–93 (2008) (noting that the problems created by
overlapping regulatory systems constitute “the strongest point in favor of ceiling preemption”).
For a thorough discussion of this debate, see William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation:
Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007).
225. See BP COMM’N, supra note 3, at 55–86 (describing various federal regulatory
oversights that led to the BP explosion and oil spill). As the Commission explains, “[t]he rig’s
demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—of federal regulation of
offshore oil drilling in the United States, and particularly of Minerals Management Service
oversight of deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.” Id. at 55–56.
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Presidents, and Secretaries of the Interior” moved in and out of
power.226 The result was an odd, and often irrational, set of rules.
“In some offshore regions,” for example, “oil drilling was essentially
banned in response to environmental concerns. Elsewhere, most
notably in the Gulf, some environmental protections and safety
oversight were formally relaxed or informally diminished so as to
render them ineffective.”227 As drilling moved further offshore and
more money poured into federal coffers, safety and environmental
risks increased. Unfortunately, these risks “were not matched by
greater, more sophisticated regulatory oversight.”228
Some problems were due to the fact that the same federal
agency, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), was “responsible
for regulatory oversight of offshore drilling—and for collecting
revenue from that drilling.”229 A 2008 study by the Interior
Department revealed numerous ethical scandals involving MMS
employees, “including allegations of financial self-dealing, accepting
gifts from energy companies, cocaine use and sexual misconduct.”230
Another Interior Department report prepared after the BP spill cited
communication problems at the Agency as well as unevenly staffed
offices and inadequate training.231 As the National Commission put
it:
[T]he overall picture of MMS that has emerged since [the spill] is
distressing. MMS became an agency systematically lacking the
resources, technical training, or experience in petroleum
engineering that is absolutely critical to ensuring that offshore

226. Id. at 56.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 65.
230. Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/
washington/11royalty.html.
231. See WILMA A. LEWIS ET AL., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD.,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR (Sep. 1,
2010), available at http://www.noia.org/website/download.asp?id=40069. The report
revealed that MMS “[e]mployee performance plans and monetary awards . . . [were
sometimes] based on meeting deadlines for leasing or development approvals—financial
incentives that could distort balanced decision-making.” Id. at 20. In the Agency’s Pacific
Region, where far less offshore drilling takes place, the ratio of inspectors to facilities was 1-to5, yet in the Gulf of Mexico, it was an astonishing 1-to-54. Id. at 13. Inspectors often lacked
necessary tools, such as laptops, and many complained of a lack of support from management.
Id. at 15.
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drilling is being conducted in a safe and responsible manner. For a
regulatory agency to fall so short of its essential safety mission is
inexcusable.232

In light of such failures, it is puzzling that critics of fracking believe
so adamantly in the superiority of national controls over a statecentric system that has worked with relatively few problems for six
decades.
C. Financial Costs of Federal Regulation
Even if fracking regulators were somehow immune from the
failures that have plagued other agencies, additional federal
regulation should not be adopted without a realistic assessment of its
price tag. Testifying before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce in 2005, Victor Carrillo, chairman of the Texas Railroad
Commission, argued that stricter federal fracking standards “would
not result in cleaner water but only in adding significant cost. Such
unnecessary regulation and the concomitant cost can only serve to
retard the development of much needed natural gas in this
country.”233 This statement seems even more appropriate six years
later, as additional research has revealed just how significant those
costs could be.
Merely studying the issue at the federal level can be expensive. As
part of its Science to Achieve Results Program, the EPA requested
$4.3 million for fracking research alone in fiscal year 2011.234 The
amount constitutes a $2.5 million increase from 2010.235 The costs
of actually administering a federal fracking regulatory program, after
research is completed and rules are drafted, would undoubtedly be
astronomically higher.
Compounding this concern is the serious potential for federal
financial waste. According to a study completed in early 2011 by the
Government Accountability Office, “overlapping and duplicative

232. BP COMM’N, supra note 3, at 57.
233. Victor Carrillo, Chairman, Tex. R.R. Comm’n Representing the Interstate Oil and
Gas Compact Comm’n, Testimony Submitted to the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce
(Feb.
10,
2005),
http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/
Hearings/02102005hearing1428/Carrillo.pdf.
234. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2011 BUDGET IN BRIEF 13–14 (Feb. 2010),
available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P10069PG.PDF.
235. Id. at 14.
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[federal] programs . . . cost taxpayers billions of dollars each year.”236
The nonpartisan office uncovered a staggering number of federal
inefficiencies, including “82 federal programs to improve teacher
quality; 80 to help disadvantaged people with transportation; 47 for
job training and employment; and 56 to help people understand
finances.”237 It seems unlikely that additional federal hydraulic
fracturing regulation, if enacted, would not suffer from similar
financial inefficiencies.
Of course, state regulatory agencies could be just as wasteful.
Nevertheless, citizens are arguably more equipped to hold local and
state government officers politically accountable for their waste.238
This is so not only because citizens generally have greater access to
local and state leaders, but also because they can compare
government spending in their state with that of neighboring states.239
In contrast, selecting appropriate foreign governments for
comparisons of federal spending seems a much more daunting task.
Regardless of the cost to taxpayers, additional federal regulation
would put a significant financial burden on developers. A 2009
report prepared for the American Petroleum Institute estimates that
national fracking legislation could increase the costs of shale plays by
$47,333 per well and non-shale plays by $109,833 per well.240
Perhaps even more troubling is that such “added costs raise the
economic threshold . . . at which a play can be developed,”
decreasing the total number of wells operators who are willing to
drill.241 As the report explains:
Experience suggests that a 20% reduction in the number of wells
completed each year due to increased regulation is a valid

236. Damian Paletta, Billions in Bloat Uncovered in Beltway, WSJ.COM (March 1, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703749504576172942399165436.html?
mod&mg=com-wsj.
237. Id.
238. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 205, at 592 (“[S]tate governments are more
directly accountable and more familiar with regional conditions . . . than the federal
government.”).
239. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting,
and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995).
240. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, MEASURING THE ECONOMIC AND ENERGY IMPACTS OF
PROPOSALS TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 10 (2009), available at
http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/IHS-GI-HydraulicFracturing-Natl-impacts.pdf.
241. Id.
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assumption due to the additional time needed to file permits, pushback of drilling schedules due to higher costs, increased chance of
litigation, injunction or other delay tactics used by opposing groups
and availability of fracturing monitoring services.242

Such costs would undoubtedly be passed along to consumers,
compounding government waste with higher prices at the pump.
V. CONCLUSION
The tremendous economic impact of hydraulic fracturing should
not be understated. As the need to replace conventional sources of
energy becomes more pressing, the United States’ dependence on
foreign oil and the risks of offshore drilling may combine to make
the debate about fracking and other unconventional forms of drilling
one of the most important energy-related issues of the twenty-first
century.
Special interest groups insist that fracking’s impact on the
environment is disastrous, but decades of study have revealed only
minor concerns. In light of federal regulatory failures such as those
that led to the BP disaster in the Gulf, leaving control of hydraulic
fracturing with the states seems to be a far more prudent course.
Local and regional industry realities should guide energy regulation
in the United States, and state officials are far more equipped than
federal employees to successfully account for the geological and
human variables that shape onshore development. State regulation of
such development has intensified as unconventional methods of
drilling have increased. In the process, courts have properly
addressed the legal aspects of hydraulic fracturing while giving
appropriate deference to agency regulations based on state common
law theories, legislative directives, environmental needs, and local
practices.
Hydraulic fracturing has played an important role in the oil and
gas industry for more than sixty years. Regulatory intrusions by the
federal government at this point will only create unnecessary financial
burdens and hinder developers’ ability to efficiently extract
hydrocarbons.

242. Id.
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As the Groundwater Protection Council warned more than a
decade ago: “If additional federal regulations were to be imposed
they would not be based on scientific observation of associated
contamination, and there would be little if any increase in protection
of public health and the environment.”243 With so little to gain, the
costs of additional federal controls are simply unjustifiable.
Matt Willie

243. GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, SURVEY RESULTS ON INVENTORY AND EXTENT
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN COALBED METHANE WELLS IN THE PRODUCING STATES 10
(1998), available at http://www.energyindepth.org/PDF/hydraulic-fracturing-inventory.pdf.
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